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CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND THE DAUBERT
STANDARD
FRED K. MORRISON,* CRAIG MANSON** & MATTHEW C. WICKERSHAM***
INTRODUCTION
Climate change science attempts to predict the future based on
complex modeling of potential levels of CO2, other greenhouse gases, manmade conditions, and naturally occurring events. Even the most widely
cited analysis of climate change studies expressly acknowledges the limitations on accurately predicting the effects of climate change on anything
other than a macro basis.1 These studies acknowledge substantial uncertainty in the prediction of climate change and its effects on a regional level,
much less on a local level.2 Recent lawsuits brought by the State of Rhode
Island; the counties of King (Washington), Marin (California), and San
Mateo (California); the cities of New York, San Francisco, Oakland, Santa
Cruz, Imperial Beach, Richmond (California), Baltimore, and Boulder; and
the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations against certain oil
companies seek funds for anticipated localized impacts of climate change,
including rising sea levels, drought, and wildfires.3 If these cases survive
*

The Honorable Fred. K. Morrison (Ret.) served nine years as a trial court judge and
fourteen years as an appellate court judge in California. During his tenure, Justice Morrison
authored over 160 published opinions. Prior to his judicial appointment, Justice Morrison
was a Professor of Law at McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific where he
taught Evidence and then an Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting fraud and
public corruption cases. For the past ten years since retiring from the Court of Appeal,
he has been mediating and arbitrating complex commercial cases.
**
The Honorable Craig Manson (Ret.) served as a trial court judge in the Superior Court
of California for over 4 years. He was Assistant Secretary of the Interior from 2002 to
2006. He has over thirty years academic, private, and government experience in the area
of public policy and natural resources law.
***
Matthew C. Wickersham is a partner in the Los Angeles office of Alston & Bird LLP,
specializing in environmental litigation.
1
Peter H. Howard & Thomas Sterner, Few and Not So Far Between: A Meta-Analysis of
Climate Damage Estimates, 68 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 197, 198 (2017).
2
See id. at 222–23.
3
Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., No. 3:18-cv-07477 (N.D. Cal.
2018); David Hasemyer, Fossil Fuels on Trial: Where the Major Climate Change Lawsuits
Stand Today, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 22, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news
/04042018/climate-change-fossil-fuel-company-lawsuits-timeline-exxon-children-cali
fornia-cities-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/WQC6-6HN3].
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various justiciability challenges, plaintiffs’ expert testimony supporting its
claims will likely be challenged under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the California Supreme Court’s decision in Sargon Enterprises,
Inc. v. University of Southern California, and other state court equivalents
on the grounds that the science underlying plaintiffs’ claims is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence.4 This Article explores the
reasons why such plaintiffs’ climate change theories and damages allegations must be carefully scrutinized under Daubert and Sargon and why the
expert theories underlying plaintiffs’ claims will likely be held inadmissible.
I.

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IS SUBJECT TO STRICT ADMISSIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS

The admissibility of expert testimony, particularly scientific evidence, is often the most heavily contested issue in any particular case.5
Whether the case involves complex patent litigation, a murder prosecution, or allegations of far-reaching environmental harm, the outcome can
often depend on the scientific experts who support a party’s case.6
Expert testimony is critical because the jury has no other means
to understand scientific evidence that is beyond the normal understanding of members of the public who have not been trained in specialized
scientific methods.7 However, the admissibility of scientific testimony must
be carefully monitored for the same reason.8 Jurors lack the resources to
recognize errors or exaggerations in the testimony.9 As the Supreme
4

Currently thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted some version of
the Daubert standard; California, Florida, Illinois, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Washington, and Maryland apply the Frye test; three states apply their own expert admissibility test. See Michael Morgenstern, Daubert v. Frye—A State-by-State Comparison,
EXPERT INST. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by
-state-comparison/ [https://perma.cc/7GHH-NHSU]. This Article is focused on federal law
and those state jurisdictions that have adopted that standard or a variation thereof. Id.
5
See Janet Hoffman & Sara Weboff, Presenting and Challenging Expert Testimony: Winning
the Battle and the War, 31 OR. ST. B. LITIG. J. 12 (2012).
6
Daniel Barskey, How Designations of Expert Witnesses Can Make or Break Privilege, ABA
(May 1, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/class-actions/ar
ticles/2017/spring2017-how-designation-of-expert-witnesses-can-make-or-break-privilege/
[https://perma.cc/2KXA-DUSP].
7
Paul W. Grimm, Challenges Facing Judges Regarding Expert Evidence in Criminal Cases,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1601 (2018); Dani Alexis Ryskamp, Why Are Expert Witnesses Important?, EXPERT INST. (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/why-are-expert
-witnesses-important/ [https://perma.cc/MVP4-2HXR].
8
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
9
See id.
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Court stated, “Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading
because of the difficulty of evaluating it.”10
A.

Courts Have Historically Been Skeptical of the Use of Expert
Testimony

Courts have long recognized that complicated cases require the
guidance of experts and professionals who are able to explain scientific
matters to the court and the jury.11 By the late 1700s, parties had begun
to retain paid experts who could support their side of the story.12 However, the historical literature shows that almost as soon as paid experts
began to testify on behalf of parties, courts and commentators expressed
concern over the influence that these witnesses had over the jury.13 By
the nineteenth century, commentators were already denouncing expert
witnesses as confusing rather than helping the jury, providing contradictory testimony in areas where the jury lacked the scientific training to
understand the issue at hand.14 As one lawyer wrote in 1899, the testimony of experts “is the subject of everybody’s sneer and the object of
everybody’s derision. It has become a newspaper jest. The public has no
confidence in expert testimony.”15 Courts during this time period repeatedly expressed similar concerns.16 As the Supreme Court stated in 1857,

10

Id.
D.H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE
8–10 (Richard D. Friedman ed., Aspen Publishers 2018); see also J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries, 9 L. & HIST. REV. 221, 222, 242–44 (1991); Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey
of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 726 (1983); Stephan
Landsman, The Rise of The Contentious Spirit, Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century
England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497 (1990).
12
See, e.g., Folkes v. Chadd (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 589; see also TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN
AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 6, 22, 25–26, 42 (2004); Tal Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert
Testimony, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 879 (2008).
13
See Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N.Y. 507, 514 (1884) (stating that expert testimony “should
not be much encouraged and should be received only in cases of necessity,” because experts’
opinions “cannot fail generally to be warped by a desire to promote the cause in which
they are enlisted.”); see also GOLAN, supra note 12, at 921.
14
Henry Wollman, Physicians—Expert Witnesses, Some Reforms, 17 MEDICO-LEGAL J.
20, 25 (1899).
15
Id. at 23.
16
See, e.g., E.E.S. Wood, Medical Testimony, 7 AM. L. 92, 94 (1899) (noting that “cases
11
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expert testimony was as “effective in producing obscurity and error as in
the elucidation of truth.”17
Over a century ago, Judge Learned Hand recognized this dilemma:
The trouble with all this is that it is setting the jury to
decide, where doctors disagree. The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not facts, as we have seen, but general truths derived from his specialized experience. But how
can the jury judge between two statements each founded
upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their
own? It is just because they are incompetent for such a
task that the expert is necessary at all.18
Courts realized that specialized procedures were necessary to protect the
jury from the improper use of expert witnesses, who could easily mislead
juries on issues far beyond their experience or prior understanding.19
B.

The Development of Standards Restricting Expert Testimony

In 1923, the first effective formulation of a solution was set forth
in the federal courts.20 In Frye v. United States, the D.C. Circuit introduced
the “general acceptance” test to determine the admissibility of scientific
evidence.21 The Frye test provided that expert opinion based on scientific
technique is admissible only where the technique is generally acceptable
in the relevant scientific community.22
condemning the value of expert witnesses and cautioning the jury against paying much
attention to their opinion, are so numerous that they form an entire literature.”).
17
McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 409 (1857); see also McNally v. Colwell, 52 N.W. 70,
73 (Mich. 1892) (“Expert evidence, while useful in many cases, is dangerous in all, and
should be restricted, for the purpose of accuracy in determining the truth, which is the
aim of all judicial investigation, to those cases where its use is well-nigh indispensable
because of questions of science or skill being involved, in which a special and peculiar
knowledge is desired in order to arrive at the truth.”); Baxter v. Chicago R. Co., 80 N.W.
644, 653 (Wis. 1899) (“[S]killed witnesses come with such a bias on their minds that
hardly any weight should be given to their evidence.”).
18
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54–55 (1901).
19
See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20
See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
21
Id.
22
Id.
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California (like many other states) adopted the Frye test.23 In People
v. Kelly, the California Supreme Court first laid out the traditional process
for admitting expert testimony: “(1) [t]he reliability of the method must
be established, usually by expert testimony, and (2) the witness furnishing
such testimony must be properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion
on the subject.”24 “Additionally, the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case.”25
In formulating the appropriate standard for determining the reliability of
a new scientific technique, the court considered leaving questions of admissibility to the “discretion of the trial court,” but instead chose to follow
the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Frye26:
Frye, and the decisions which have followed it, rather than
turning to the trial judge have assigned the task of determining reliability of the evolving technique to members of
the scientific community from which the new method
emerges . . . . “The requirement of general acceptance in
the scientific community assures that those most qualified
to assess the general validity of a scientific method will
have the determinative voice.”27
The court indicated that “general acceptance” could not be established by
the testimony of a single witness attesting to the views of the scientific
community and instead “resolution of the general acceptance issue would
require consideration of the views of a typical cross-section of the scientific community, including representatives, if there are such, of those who
oppose or question the new technique.”28
The court in Kelly recognized that new advances in science are not
necessarily ready for use at trial, echoing age-old concerns that juries can
be improperly swayed by confusing scientific testimony.29 “There has
always existed a considerable lag between advances and discoveries in
scientific fields and their acceptance as evidence in a court proceeding.”30
23

People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted).
25
Id. (internal submissions omitted).
26
Id.
27
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743–44 (1974)).
28
Id. at 1248.
29
See Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1245.
30
Id. (quoting People v. Spigno, 319 P.2d 458, 464 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)); see also Moore
v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 278–79 (5th Cir. 1998); Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84
24
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The court mirrored the concerns expressed decades earlier by Judge
Hand: “Lay jurors tend to give considerable weight to ‘scientific’ evidence
when presented by ‘experts’ with impressive credentials.”31 The court
further “acknowledged the existence of a ‘. . . misleading aura of certainty
which often envelops a new scientific process, obscuring its currently
experimental nature.’ ”32
While the Kelly-Frye rule expanded the scope of the court’s inquiry into the admissibility of scientific evidence, it was also criticized as
being narrowly focused on whether the methodology used by an expert was
new or novel, without requiring inquiry into whether that methodology
was actually reliable or trustworthy.33
C.

A Gatekeeper Role Provides Courts with Flexibility to Guard
Against Admission of Unreliable Testimony

In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, providing
flexibility in determining whether expert testimony should be considered
reliable.34 Rule 702 established that expert testimony only needed to be
relevant evidence that was able to “assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”35
Almost twenty years after the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in.36 It agreed that the Federal
Rules of Evidence mandated a more flexible analysis than set forth under
Frye.37 Instead, the Supreme Court in Daubert incorporated the “general
acceptance” test as one of four non-exclusive factors for evaluating the
reliability of scientific evidence.38 The additional factors identified were
F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 1996); Downs v. Perstorp Components, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1128–29 (E.D. Tenn. 1999); Kinn v. HCR ManorCare, 998 N.E.2d 852, 861 (Ohio Ct. App.
2013).
31
Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1245.
32
Id. (quoting Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P.2d 382, 390 (Cal. 1966)); see also United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that “scientific proof may
in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury.”).
33
See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The reliability
inquiry that we envision is flexible and may turn on a number of considerations, in contrast
to the process of scientific ‘nose-counting’ that would appear to be compelled by a careful
reading of Frye.”).
34
Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. 93-595, Art. VII, 88 Stat. 1926, 1928, 1937–38 (1975).
35
FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (repealed 2000).
36
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
37
Id. at 592, 594–95.
38
Id. at 594.
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the testability or falsifiability of the theory, the degree that the theory has
been subject to peer review, and the known or potential rate of error.39 In
2000, the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended to incorporate the reasoning in Daubert, specifically providing that evidence is admissible only
if (1) “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data,” (2) “the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods,” and (3) “the expert has
reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”40
In practice, Daubert resulted in an increase in the exclusion of
expert testimony by trial courts during preliminary rulings.41 In adopting
a flexible standard, combined with the Court’s admonition that trial
courts must adopt “a gatekeeping role” to “screen” out unreliable testimony,” Daubert allowed federal trial courts to resolve the deadlock that
can otherwise result when dueling experts provide contradictory opinions
to a lay jury that lacks the resources or means to distinguish between two
opposing sets of opinions dealing with highly complex scientific theories
and large amounts of data.42
D.

California Trial Courts Have Analogous Standards Precluding
the Admissibility of Unreliable Expert Testimony

California law has followed a similar progression in providing
trial courts with greater authority to screen out unreliable expert testimony. In Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California,
the California Supreme Court delineated the scope of a trial court’s substantial responsibility to exclude improper expert testimony.43 Just as in
Daubert, the court in Sargon affirmed that, under California law, trial
courts have an obligation to act as a gatekeeper in screening out unreliable
testimony.44 “[U]nder Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and
802, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude expert testimony that
is (1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably
39

Id. at 593–94.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
41
See, e.g., LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING
EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION 41 (Rand Inst.
for Civil Justice 2001), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports
/2005/MR1439.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8SX-6BQK]; D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert
Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV.
99, 104 (2000); Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical Studies
Tell Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 143 (2005).
42
See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; see also Vickers, supra note 41, at 143.
43
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012).
44
Id. at 1252; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
40
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rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative.”45 The focus of the trial court’s gatekeeping
function is not on the conclusions reached by the expert but rather on the
reliability of the principles and methodology applied to generate them.46
“This means that a court may inquire into, not only the type of material
on which an expert relies, but also whether that material actually supports the expert’s reasoning. ‘A court may conclude that there is simply
too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.’ ”47
“In short, the gatekeeper’s role ‘is to make certain that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs
in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes
the practice of an expert in the relevant field.’ ”48
In explaining the scope of the “substantial ‘gatekeeping’ responsibility” imposed on the trial courts, the court in Sargon emphasized the
holding in Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. that
[I]t is the jury system itself that requires the common law
“judge, in his efforts to prevent the jury from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated
by prejudice and hasty reasoning . . . to exclude matter
which does not rise to a clearly sufficient degree of value”;
“something more than a minimum of probative value” is
required. . . . These comments are especially pertinent to
an array of figures conveying a delusive impression of exactness in an area where a jury’s common sense is less
available than usual to protect it.49
The Court’s pronouncements in Sargon are part of a consistent
trend in federal and California law towards imbuing trial courts with the
flexibility and discretion to exclude unreliable testimony that would be
misleading and deceptive to the jury.50 Under both federal and state law,
trial courts have an obligation to strictly examine scientific evidence to
45

Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252.
Id.; see also People v. Stamps, 3 Cal. App. 5th 988, 994 (2016) (“[T]rial courts . . . are
charged with an important gatekeeping ‘duty’ to exclude expert testimony when necessary
to prevent unreliable evidence and insupportable reasoning from coming before the jury.”).
47
Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252 (internal citations omitted).
48
Id. (internal citations omitted).
49
Id. at 1250 (quoting Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 297 F.2d
906, 912 (1962)) (emphasis added).
50
See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 183 P.3d 1146, 1178 (Cal. 2008); People v. Prince, 156
P.3d 1015, 1049 n.8 (Cal. 2007) (noting the trial court’s “gatekeeping responsibility”).
46
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ensure that the expert’s testimony is “the product of reliable principles
and methods.”51 The mandate for this careful examination is a recognition
that expert testimony, particularly on scientific issues, can be fundamentally deceptive to juries where such testimony exudes an aura of exactitude
that is not supported by the underlying data.52 Without a meaningful
process to control the admission of this testimony, juries have little ability
to ascertain for themselves whether the expert opinion is based on reliable evidence.53
In enforcing this obligation, courts must pay close attention to the
critical difference between how scientific truth is discovered in the laboratory, and how scientific truth is sought and applied in the courtroom.54
Simply put, the scientific process of constantly trying new hypotheses
and assimilating new data is fundamentally inconsistent with a legal
process that requires the efficient, conclusive and final resolution of legal
controversies.55 As the U.S. Supreme Court put it in Daubert, “Scientific
conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand,
must resolve disputes finally and quickly.”56 The Daubert Court specifically identified this dichotomy:
We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the
judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will
prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and
innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck
by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search
for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.57
In other words, the courtroom is not the place to adjudicate new
theories or scientific uncertainties nor to ascertain the outer limits of
scientific knowledge.58 The court system is meant to resolve legal disputes in an efficient, comprehensive and final manner. The courtroom is
no place for expert opinions that are anecdotal, in progress, not yet fully
51

FED. R. EVID. 702.
See Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1250.
53
See id.
54
Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 275 (1998).
55
See id.
56
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (emphasis added).
57
Id. (emphasis added).
58
Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996); Flores v. Allstate Tex.
Lloyd’s Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 697, 700–04 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Colon v. BIC USA, Inc., 199
F. Supp. 2d 53, 75–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
52

400

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 44:391

formed, or are at the leading edge of new scientific theories.59 Similarly,
courts must determine whether the evidence proffered is genuinely scientific, as distinct from being unscientific speculation offered by a genuine scientist.60
II.

CLIMATE CHANGE CASES WILL NECESSARILY REQUIRE EXPERT
TESTIMONY SHOWING THAT CARBON EMISSIONS CAUSED
PLAINTIFFS’ INJURIES

These standards apply to the increasing number of cases being
filed by states, counties, municipalities, NGOs, and individuals alleging
that global warming or climate change has caused or will cause them
harm. Ever since the Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that greenhouse gases
are “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act, various cases have been filed
seeking damages or injunctive relief on the grounds that insufficient
action has been taken in response to anthropogenic (or human-caused)
climate change.61 While these cases most often have been dismissed at
early stages based on preemption or the political question doctrine (and
affirmed on appeal),62 similar cases continue to be filed.63
In 2017 and 2018, eight cities and counties in California, along with
New York City, counties and municipalities in Colorado and Washington
State, and the State of Rhode Island, brought civil lawsuits against numerous oil and gas companies, alleging that their fossil fuel production and
59

Rosen, 78 F.3d at 319; Wheat v. Pfizer, Inc., 31 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1994); Downs v.
Perstorp Components, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1128 (E.D. Tenn. 1999). Similar holdings have also applied the Frye test. Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 851 (Fla. 2001);
Moore v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Grp., 241 P.3d 808, 815–16 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
60
Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 677 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Rosen, 78 F.3d
at 318); Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 278–79 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Rosen,
78 F.3d at 318).
61
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Hasemyer, supra note 3.
62
See, e.g., American Elec. Power Co. v. Connnecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011); Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053 (5th Cir. 2010).
63
See, e.g., City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that
“[g]lobal warming and solutions thereto must be addressed by the two other branches of
government.”); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(holding that “questions of how to appropriately balance these worldwide negatives
against the worldwide positives of the energy itself, and of how to allocate the pluses and
minuses among the nations of the world, demand the expertise of our environmental agencies, our diplomats, our Executive, and at least the Senate,” and that “[n]uisance suits in
various United States judicial districts regarding conduct worldwide are far less likely
to solve the problem and, indeed, could interfere with reaching a worldwide consensus”).
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sales contribute to increased carbon emissions, which in turn have caused
global warming.64 Similarly, in late 2018, suit was filed in state court in
San Francisco by an association of fishermen alleging that climate change
caused by fifteen oil companies resulted in algae blooms that harmed
Dungeness crab fisheries.65 These cases generally assert claims sounding
in nuisance and occasionally negligence, alleging that companies knew
that their production and sale of fossil fuels would cause global warming,
rising waters, and other climate-related effects.66 These plaintiffs claim
that oil companies should pay for the local government’s increased infrastructure costs incurred to combat the effects of climate change.67
The claims brought by the cities of San Francisco and Oakland
were dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, and are currently pending on appeal.68 Other climate change
actions brought by other cities and counties in California have been remanded back to state court, subject to an interlocutory appeal to the
Ninth Circuit.69 Assuming that these lawsuits are allowed to proceed in
California state court and are not dismissed on jurisdictional grounds,
plaintiffs will be required to present admissible expert testimony to demonstrate that defendants’ conduct in producing and marketing oil and gas
was a substantial factor in causing their harm.70
There have also been lawsuits brought by groups of individuals
alleging that federal or certain state governments are obligated to take
further action to slow or abate climate change.71 For example, in Juliana
v. United States, several minor plaintiffs have brought claims under the
public trust doctrine, demanding that the federal government cease
64

Hasemyer, supra note 3.
Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., No. 3:2018cv07477 (N.D.
Cal. filed Dec. 12, 2018).
66
Complaint at ¶¶ 179–90, ¶¶ 218–39, Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v.
Chevron Corp., No. 3:2018cv07477; Hasemyer, supra note 3.
67
Complaint at ¶¶ 179–90, ¶¶ 218–39, Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v.
Chevron Corp., No. 3:2018cv07477; Hasemyer, supra note 3.
68
City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. at 1028. Similarly, the lawsuit brought by the City of
New York was dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
and has been appealed to the Second Circuit. Plaintiff ’s Notice of Appeal at 1, City of N.Y.
v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-2188cv (2d Cir. July 26, 2018).
69
County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(granting motions to remand).
70
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997) (“California has
definitively adopted the substantial factor test [such that] . . . a cause in fact is something
that is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.”).
71
See Hasemyer, supra note 3.
65
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government programs that subsidize or foster development of oil and gas
resources.72 They allege standing based on how they have been impacted
by a variety of physical phenomena, such as current and projected drought
and lack of snow; ocean acidification; algal blooms; an invasion of Sargassum seaweed on local beaches; climate-induced migration of forest species; and increases in forest fires, ice storms, hurricanes, and tornadoes.73
At least nine similar lawsuits have been filed in state courts from Alaska
to Florida.74
Climate change cases brought in federal or state courts require a
showing that the localized impacts alleged as the basis for standing have
in fact been caused by climate change. “To satisfy the causality element
for Article III standing, Plaintiffs must show that the injury is causally
linked or ‘fairly traceable’ to the Agencies’ alleged misconduct, and not
the result of misconduct of some third party not before the Court.”75 Courts
have been quick to dismiss climate change actions where the requisite
showing of causation has not been satisfied. Washington Environmental
Council v. Bellon held that there is “a natural disjunction between Plaintiffs’ localized injuries and the greenhouse effect.”76
In Juliana, the district court denied the government’s motion to
dismiss on standing grounds, relying on the fact that “[a] plaintiff must
support each element of the standing test ‘with the manner and degree
of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.’ ”77 Because
“at the motion to dismiss stage ‘general allegations’ suffice to establish
72

In re United States, 884 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Twenty-one young plaintiffs
brought suit against the United States, the President, and various Executive Branch
officials and agencies, alleging that the defendants have contributed to climate change
in violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”).
73
First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 16–90, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D.
Or. 2016).
74
State Judicial Actions Now Pending, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrens
trust.org/pending-state-actions [https://perma.cc/6BGY-TVHV] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
But see Aji P. v. State of Washington, No. 18-2-04448-1, 2018 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct.,
Aug. 14, 2018) (granting motion to dismiss Washington state court action on the basis
that the alleged issues are political questions that cannot be resolved by a court and must
be addressed by the executive and legislative branch).
75
Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013).
76
Id. at 1143–44 (“Because a multitude of independent third parties are responsible for
the changes contributing to Plaintiffs’ injuries, the causal chain is too tenuous to support
standing.”); see also Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863,
880–81 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
77
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1242 (D. Or. 2016) (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)), interlocutory appeal certified, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 207366, at *11–12 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2018).
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standing,”78 the court overlooked the fact that there were only “conclusory” allegations of a “causal chain” linking the plaintiffs’ injuries with the
government’s policies in favor of oil and gas production.79 The court noted
that “[e]ach link in these causal chains may be difficult to prove, but the
‘spectre of difficulty down the road does not inform [the] justiciability determination at this early stage of the proceedings.’ ”80 Therefore, the
district court allowed these claims to proceed past the motion to dismiss
stage, although the court subsequently certified its denial of the government’s pretrial motions for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, after multiple requests for a stay and mandamus relief were
filed in the higher courts.81
However, “[i]n response to a summary judgment motion . . . [a
plaintiff’s claims] can no longer rest on mere allegations, but must set
forth by affidavit or other admissible evidence the specific facts,” which
will be taken as true for purposes of summary judgment.82 At the final
stage, those facts, if controverted, “must be supported adequately by the
evidence adduced at trial.”83 So even though the plaintiffs in Juliana
seek only injunctive and declaratory relief challenging certain governmental policies,84 any determination about the merits of their claims will
necessarily require evidence in the form of expert testimony that climate
change has in fact caused plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.
Accordingly, whether lawsuits are asserted against oil companies
or governmental agencies, any claims that survive jurisdictional challenges will be required to show through expert testimony a causal link
between the plaintiffs’ purported injuries and resulting anthropogenic
climate change. In lawsuits brought against oil companies, plaintiffs will
have to present admissible evidence tying a specific defendant’s conduct to
a particular consequence of climate change and showing that anthropogenic climate change will result in the claimed damage. In lawsuits
78

Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1246.
80
Id. (quoting Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 539 (9th Cir. 2005)).
81
Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207366, at
*11–12 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2018).
82
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 (1979)).
83
Id.
84
This is in contrast to the other referenced climate change cases where the plaintiffs
seek damages related to the impacts of climate change and the alleged costs of responding
to climate change. These cases seeking damages will present other issues beyond causation,
including claims of speculative damages, etc.
79
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demanding further government action, the plaintiffs similarly will have
to present admissible evidence showing that they have standing because
anthropogenic climate change has caused them the specific harm claimed
or is reasonably expected to cause them harm. In either case, any final
determination of these lawsuits will ultimately depend upon admissible
scientific evidence attributing localized impacts to global climate change
that was caused by human activity.
III.

THE SPECIFIC CLAIMS REGARDING CLIMATE CHANGE

The lawsuits filed by plaintiffs alleging that oil companies’ development and sale of fossil fuels has caused catastrophic climate change all
allege similar types of injury or damage. Plaintiffs allege that defendants
are responsible for sea level rise and associated storm surges, drought,
reduced snowpack, increased wildfires, extreme temperature increases and
resulting forest die-offs, crop failures, and other types of ecosystem damage.85 For the most part, these claims are focused on the local or regional
effects of climate change with plaintiffs alleging damages that have been
or will be incurred to respond to the dangers caused by anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases.
In order to prevail, these plaintiffs will have to show that sealevel rise, drought, increased wildfires, and other climate effects resulted
from the conduct of the defendant and has caused or is reasonably likely
to cause the harm to them. Plaintiffs must also show that these alleged
impacts of climate change are the result of anthropogenic forcings and
not natural forcings or simply the natural variability of the weather. And
these claims will also be required to overcome the fact that similar levels
of rising temperatures and their impacts have occurred in the past that
cannot be attributed to human activities.86 Courts have dismissed climate change actions where the requisite showing of causation has not
been satisfied, holding as in Bellon that there is “a natural disjunction
between Plaintiffs’ localized injuries and the greenhouse effect.”87
85

See Complaint at ¶¶ 103–09, City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-cv-00182-JFK (S.D.N.Y.
2018); Complaint at ¶¶ 85–90, People v. BP P.L.C., No. RG17875889 (Cal. Super. Ct.
2017); Complaint at ¶¶ 111–15, Bd. of Comm’rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (USA),
Inc., No. 2018CV30349 (Colo. D. Ct. 2018).
86
Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013).
87
Id. at 1143–44 (holding that “[b]ecause a multitude of independent third parties are
responsible for the changes contributing to Plaintiffs’ injuries, the causal chain is too
tenuous to support standing.”); see also Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 880–81 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
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THE STUDY OF CLIMATE SCIENCE

Expert testimony will play an important role in climate change
cases (that survive jurisdictional challenges). Given the complexity of the
issues and lack of direct evidence, expert testimony will be necessary to
prove causation. For those municipalities, counties, and states that have
sued individual companies based on their alleged contribution to global
carbon emissions, expert testimony will be required to show that these
companies have actually caused or contributed to the damages claimed
by plaintiffs.
A.

The IPCC Cannot Provide a Basis for Plaintiffs’ Causation
Conclusions

This Article does not examine specific opinions that have been set
forth by designated experts in climate change cases. Instead, it examines
whether the principles and methods that could potentially be relied upon
by the expert are sufficiently reliable, and whether these principles and
methods can be properly applied for the purposes for which they will be
needed in the climate change cases.
With respect to climate science, plaintiffs are likely to rely on the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”).88 “The [IPCC] was
established by the United Nations Environment Programme [“UNEP”]
and the World Meteorological Organization [“WMO”] in 1988” to help establish a scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate
change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts.89 In
the same year, the UN General Assembly endorsed the action by WMO
and UNEP in jointly establishing the IPCC.90
The IPCC periodically publishes reports specifying the current
status and limits of the international community’s understanding of climate change and its association with human activities. The IPCC published its First Assessment Report (“FAR”) in 1990, a supplementary report
in 1992, a Second Assessment Report (“SAR”) in 1995, a Third Assessment
88

An argument could be made that the IPCC reports, themselves, do not meet the standard for admissibility. However, this Article does not address that argument. This Article
also does not address whether the IPCC reports are suitable for other decision-making,
such as policy positions. Rather, this Article assumes that the IPCC reports will be recognized and plaintiffs will attempt to use the reports to draw further individual conclusions.
89
About the IPCC, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.ipcc.ch
/about/history/ [https://perma.cc/56MX-DRV9] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
90
Id.

406

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 44:391

Report (“TAR”) in 2001, a Fourth Assessment Report (“AR4”) in 2007 and
a Fifth Assessment Report (“AR5”) in 2014.91 The IPCC is currently preparing the Sixth Assessment Report (“AR6”), which will be completed in
2022.92 Although the IPCC’s findings and conclusions are not universally
accepted, plaintiffs are likely to put forth these reports as authoritative
sources in terms of what areas are still uncertain and what areas need
additional research.
In the most recently published report, AR5, the IPCC discusses
the current state of climate science, and particularly the limits in which
that science is competent to predict future events and attribute natural
phenomena to anthropogenic climate change. Throughout AR5, the authors
specify the degree of confidence for their conclusions and findings.93 “A
level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: ‘very low,’ ‘low,’ ‘medium,’ ‘high,’ and ‘very high.’ ”94

91

Id.
Id.
93
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AR5 CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 2 (2015), https://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/ipcc/resources/pdf/IPCC_SynthesisRe
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP5W-4ZQC] [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT] (stating that key
assessment findings are “based on the author teams’ evaluations of underlying scientific
understanding and is expressed as a qualitative level of confidence (from very low to very
high) and, when possible, probabilistically with a quantified likelihood (from exceptionally unlikely to virtually certain)”).
94
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GUIDANCE NOTE FOR LEAD AUTHORS
OF THE IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT ON CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES
3 (2010), https://wg1.ipcc.ch/AR6/documents/AR5_Uncertainty_Guidance_Note.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KEU5-76ZZ] [hereinafter GUIDANCE NOTE].
92
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Figure 195
For AR5, these confidence levels are based on a sliding scale assessment of the evidence supporting a conclusion (as either robust, medium,
or limited) and the degree of scientific agreement for that conclusion
(high, medium, or low).96 Thus, a low level of confidence means that a
finding is based on limited evidence or low agreement among the scientists. Models relied on by the IPCC in AR5 had a 60 percent confidence
level which is a much lower confidence level than is traditionally accepted by scientists—90 to 95 percent—to establish a fact scientifically.97
The existing uncertainty of AR5’s predictions is also established by the
95

Confidence and Likelihood in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, Fact Sheet, AUSTL.
GOV’T, DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, https://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/b4ba
2892-f126-4c4f-a47e-08ca3767eacf/files/wa-decoding-confidence-and-likelihood-ipcc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B39W-KBNJ] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
96
GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 94, at 3. It should be noted that this Guidance Note explains that confidence should not be interpreted probabilistically, and it is distinct from
“statistical confidence.”
97
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AR5 CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 8, 36, 49 (2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02
/WG1AR5_all_final.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2013]; Liz Roth-Johnson, Confidence
Intervals: Statistical Techniques, VISIONLEARNING (2016), https://www.visionlearning.com
/en/library/Math-in-Science/62/Confidence-Intervals/239 [https://perma.cc/46RL-QBU9].
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prediction range relating to future climate warming, which projects that
temperatures may increase between 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit to 11.5 degrees
Fahrenheit by 2100.98 Models which have a two in five chance of being
wrong simply do not have the requisite degree of reliability to impose liability in a court of law.
Additionally, AR5 acknowledges the potential fallibility of its conclusions on all aspects of climate change and that its conclusions are subject
to change “[e]ven after publication, findings are further analysed and
evaluated. That is the self-correcting nature of the scientific process.”99
Through the progression of five assessment reports, starting in
1990, the IPCC has increased its confidence level that global warming
has been influenced by human activities.100 The rest of the analysis and
assessment laid out in AR5 makes clear that significant gaps still exist
in the scientific knowledge about climate change. The IPCC reports address
the potential global, regional, and local impacts of climate change.101 While
the IPCC speaks with confidence regarding some of its findings, it also
acknowledges that some of its prior predictions of the nature and extent
of climate change have been overstated and proven to be erroneous.102
B.

Climate Models Make Numerous Assumptions that May Be
Inaccurate or Imprecise

The study of climate science and the conclusions reached in the
IPCC Reports are based primarily on the study of climate models.103 The
global climate of the Earth is extraordinarily complicated, and climate
models are needed to create a virtual system that is intended to evolve
in the same way as the real world. Various algorithms are used to represent the interaction of different elements of the climate system, including
solar activity, the atmosphere, land surface, ocean surface, and sea ice.
Over time, modeling tools became more complicated as the computing
process became more powerful. As these models become more complicated,
the AR5 Report recognizes that the increase in complexity necessarily results in new sources of possible error and increased uncertainty:
98

Glen Scherer, IPCC Predictions: Then Versus Now, CLIMATE CENT. (Dec. 11, 2012), https://
www.climatecentral.org/news/ipcc-predictions-then-versus-now-15340 [https://perma.cc
/26U4-XJM7].
99
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 123.
100
GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 94, at 5.
101
SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 93, at 76.
102
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 43.
103
Id. at 4.
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Climate models of today are, in principle, better than their
predecessors. However, every bit of added complexity, while
intended to improve some aspect of simulated climate, also
introduces new sources of possible error (e.g., via uncertain
parameters) and new interactions between model components
that may, if only temporarily, degrade a model’s simulation
of other aspects of the climate system. Furthermore, despite
the progress that has been made, scientific uncertainty regarding the details of many processes remains.104
This uncertainty is confirmed by the fact that many of the climate
change conclusions presented in AR5 discuss climate change in terms of
ranges of possible anthropogenic forcings or the range of potential temperature increases. For example, there is wide variation in AR5 predictions regarding the potential extent of the amount of carbon dioxide that
can be expected to be present in the Earth’s atmosphere, which in turn
affect the potential impacts of climate change. AR5 presents four different
Representative Concentration Pathways (“RCPs”) for climate modeling
and research, which describe different climate futures, all of which are
considered possible depending on how much greenhouse gas is emitted
in the years to come.105 The variations are significant, with the RCP’s range
varying by more than three times from the low end to the high end.106
The variation occurs because models require scientists to make numerous
assumptions about not only anthropogenic forces but also natural forces
(e.g., cloud cover, volcanic eruptions, solar radiation, etc.) that depend on
the occurrence of future events, which obviously may or may not occur.107
Additionally, AR5 presents three different models that project the
Earth’s temperature through 2050. These different models make significantly different assumptions and are widely at variance with one another.108 Based on the models and the mission scenarios the range gets
104

Id. at 824 (emphasis added).
Id. at 29.
106
Id. (“They are identified by their approximate total radiative forcing in year 2100
relative to 1750: 2.6 W m-2 for RCP2.6, 4.5 W m-2 for RCP4.5, 6.0 W m-2 for RCP6.0, and
8.5 W m-2 for RCP8.5.”).
107
Id. at 13–14.
108
“The increase of global mean surface temperature by the end of the 21st century
(2081–2100) relative to 1986–2005 is likely to be 0.3°C to 1.7°C under RCP2.6, 1.1°C to
2.6°C under RCP4.5, 1.4°C to 3.1°C under RCP6.0 and 2.6°C to 4.8°C under RCP8.5.” See
SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 93, at 10.
105

410

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 44:391

wider as it gets farther out in the future, reflecting the common sense
notion that it’s harder to predict things as they go into the future.109
The variability and breadth of the possible outcomes should raise
substantial concerns with respect to the reliability of expert opinions
relating to predicted climate change outcomes for the courtroom.
C.

Erroneous Predictions Plagued Prior Climate Change Models

Despite the increasing complexity of these models, they still struggle to compete with the complexity of the natural world. Instead, modelers
must rely upon calibration in order to reduce uncertainties in the model
by adjusting their model to accurately reflect a past event that has already
occurred.110 However, calibrating a model to past events provides no certainty that these models will be effective at accurately predicting future
events. Instead, calibration may only confirm that a model accurately conforms to the past but does not mean it will accurately predict the future.111
IPCC’s AR5 identifies three “main” sources of uncertainty in the
climate models used to predict future climate change. The first relates to
“natural internal variability which is intrinsic to the climate system.”112
The second is the existing “uncertainty concerning past, present and
future forcing on the climate system by anthropogenic forcing agents,”
including lack of direct or proxy observations and observational errors.113
The third is the “uncertainty related to the response of the climate system to the specified forcing agents.”114 In other words, the IPCC recognizes that so much is unknown, the variables are so vast, and our ability
to analyze them so limited, that no one can be Nostradamus.
The model uncertainties impact the reliability of the IPCC climate
change predictions. Indeed, the IPCC has documented that the vast majority of models have not accurately predicted future events. AR5 explained
109

See id.
Matthew W. Swinehart, Remedying Daubert’s Inadequacy in Evaluating the Admissibility of Scientific Models Used in Environmental-Tort Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1281,
1291 (2008).
111
Richard Martin, Why Climate Models Aren’t Better, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 18, 2015),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/543546/why-climate-models-arent-better/
[https://perma.cc/5YH4-X5MV] (“Models are getting more accurate in the sense that they
simulate things more realistically, but . . . that has not really helped in decreasing the
uncertainty in future projections.”).
112
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 978.
113
Id.
114
Id.
110
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that “[f]or the period from 1998 to 2012, 111 of the 114 available climatemodel simulations show a surface warming trend larger than the observations.”115 Thus, the IPCC stated in AR5 that “[s]ome models may be too
sensitive to anthropogenic forcing,” which means that the models were
assuming a greater effect on temperatures from human activity than
what actually turned out to be the case based on actual observed temperatures.116 This inaccuracy appears to reflect the overarching assumption
by the global climate models that the increase in carbon dioxide is the driving force behind average global temperature, overlooking “the patterns
and timing of multidecadal ocean oscillations” and “future solar variations
and solar indirect effects on climate.”117 Whatever the exact reasons, 97
percent of the climate models from 1998 to 2012 were simply incorrect.118
AR5 also noted numerous areas where the current state of climate
models cannot match natural phenomena, such as the complex dynamics
of clouds. Clouds can have a significant influence on the impact that
greenhouse gases have on air temperature.119 As stated in AR5, “Climate
models now include more cloud and aerosol processes and their interactions than at the time of the AR4, but there remains low confidence in
the representation and quantification of these processes in models.”120 As
stated above, by recognizing “low confidence” in the ability of these models
to incorporate fundamental aspects of the natural environment, the models
are inherently unreliable to predict the future effects of climate change.
Additionally, the lack of historical data prevents scientists from
explaining significant historical climate events. For instance, the AR5
report acknowledges that the available data shows that during times of
substantially lower carbon emissions, sea level rise has previously risen at
similar rates to those currently being seen, but then levels subsequently
fell. The AR noted that “[t]he multi-decadal variability [of global mean sea
115

SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 93, at 43. In fact, the global climate models resulted
in predicted temperature increases twice as high as the observed increases so far during
the twenty-first century. JUDITH CURRY, GLOBAL WARMING POLICY FOUND., CLIMATE
MODELS FOR THE LAYMAN 14 (2017) (“So far in the 21st century, the GCMs are warming,
on average, about a factor of 2 faster than the observed temperature increase.”).
116
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 1010; Anthropogenic Forcing, REALCLIMATE
(Nov. 28, 2004), http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2004/11/anthropogenic
-forcing/ [https://perma.cc/8KHF-62FH].
117
CURRY, supra note 115, at 16.
118
See SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 93, at 43.
119
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 676 (“It is shown that clouds can reduce the
magnitude of RF due to GHGs by about 25%.”).
120
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 16 (note that “low confidence” means that a
finding is based on limited evidence or low scientific agreement).
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level] is marked by an increasing trend starting in 1910–1920, a downward
trend . . . starting around 1950, and an increasing trend starting around
1980.”121 “It is likely that [Global Mean Sea Level] rose between 1920 and
1950 at a rate comparable to that observed between 1993 and 2010.”122
D.

Climate Models Cannot Accurately Predict How Climate
Change Will Cause Local Impacts

The majority of the climate predictions in AR5 that are expressed
with higher levels of confidence address broader climate trends such as
“global mean surface temperature” increases or “global mean sea level
rise,” “ocean warming,” or “ocean acidification.”123 This is in contrast to
predictions of regional or local climate change impacts, which are subject
to more variability and are prone to even greater errors.124 Additionally,
likely long-term impacts are presented with greater certainty than the
impacts of climate change that will occur in the near future.125
A major reason for that oddity is that predications of regional
climate change impacts are developed by taking global climate change
models and “downscaling” inputs to develop regional models.126 The IPCC
AR5 Report criticized relying on such downscaling:
Downscaling of global climate reconstruction and models
has advanced to bring the climate data to a closer match
for the temporal and special resolution requirements for
assessing many regional impacts and the application of
downscaled climate data has expanded substantially since
AR4. This information remains weakly coordinated, and
current results indicate that high resolution downscaled
121

Id. at 289; see also id. Figure 3.14.
Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
123
Id. at 257–59.
124
The ultimate source of most such errors is that many important small-scale processes
cannot be represented explicitly in models, and so must be included in approximate form
as they interact with larger-scale features. Myles Allen et al., Model Error in Weather
and Climate Forecasting, 8 NONLINEAR PROCESSES GEOPHYSICS 275, 279 (2001).
125
Andrew C. Revkin, Failed 2008 Cooling Prediction Shows Short-Term Climate Models
Remain a Bad Bet, N.Y. TIMES: DOT EARTH (Nov. 17, 2015), https://dotearth.blogs.ny
times.com/2015/11/17/failed-2008-cooling-prediction-shows-short-term-climate-forecasts
-remain-a-bad-bet/ [https://perma.cc/7X7J-9ZCW].
126
Downscaling, CLIMATE CHANGE AUSTL., https://www.climatechangeinaustralia.gov
.au/en/climate-campus/modelling-and-projections/climate-models/downscaling/ [https://
perma.cc/KZ9Q-9YJR] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
122
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reconstructions of current climate can have significant errors. The increase in downscaled data sets has not narrowed
the uncertainty range.127
Thus AR5 admits that the available science does not allow accurate predictions of how climate change will affect specific regions and local areas.
This includes predictions of the rise in sea levels. Sea level rise is
not uniform throughout the world. “Since the late 20th century, satellite
measurements of the height of the ocean surface relative to the center of
the Earth (known as geocentric sea level) show differing rates of geocentric sea level change around the world.”128 “[T]hose in the eastern Pacific
Ocean are lower than the global mean value, with much of the west coast
of the Americas experiencing a fall in sea surface height over the same
period.”129 The AR5 report recognizes that these regional variabilities
remain difficult to predict:
While it is likely that extreme sea levels have increased
globally since the 1970s, mainly as a result of mean sea
level rise due in part to anthropogenic warming, local sea
level trends are also influenced by factors such as regional
variability in ocean and atmospheric circulation, subsidence, isostatic adjustment, coastal erosion, and coastal
modification. As a consequence, the detection of the impact of climate change in observed changes in relative sea
level remains challenging.130
While AR5 concludes that there is a general “positive value”131
evidencing a rise in “global mean sea level,” such multi-decadal variability, along with the limited amount of data that is available for vast areas
of the Earth’s ocean, prevent more than a general conclusion about rising
sea levels.132
127

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AR5 CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTION, AND VULNERABILITY, PART B: REGIONAL ASPECTS 1137–38 (2014), https://

www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-PartB_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc
/T5GH-NQL5] [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, PART B] (emphasis added).
128
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 1148.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 290.
132
Benjamin P. Horton et al., Mapping Sea-Level Change in Time, Space, and Probability,
ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 481, 511 (2018).
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There is still considerable uncertainty on how long largescale patterns of regional sea level change can persist, especially in the Pacific where the majority of tide gauge records
are less than 40 years long. Based on analyses of the longest
records in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans (including the available gauges in the Southern Ocean) there are
significant multi-decadal variations in regional sea level
(Holgate, 2007; Woodworth et al., 2009, 2011; Mitchum et
al., 2010; Chambers et al., 2012). Hence local rates of sea
level rise can be considerably higher or lower than the global
mean rate for periods of a decade or more.133
Plaintiffs in climate change cases also frequently point to the increased risk of coastal flooding in regional or local areas as the basis for
their risk of harm.134 However, AR5 also specifically disclaimed current
science’s ability to detect whether any specific instance of coastal flooding
is a result of climate change, concluding that “[t]otal damages from coastal
flooding have increased globally over the last decades (high confidence);
however, with exposure and subsidence constituting the major drivers,
confidence in detection of a climate change impact is very low.”135
133

CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 288–89.
See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 10, City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(alleging that “global warming is already causing the City to suffer increased hot days,
flooding of low-lying areas, increased shoreline erosion, and higher threats of catastrophic
storm surge flooding even more severe than the flooding from Hurricane Sandy.”);
Complaint at ¶¶ 7, 13, County of Marin v. Chevron Corp., No. 1702586 (Cal. Super. Ct.
filed July 17, 2017) (alleging that “Defendants are directly responsible for a substantial
portion of committed sea level rise” which will cause the County to suffer “increased inundation (permanent) and flooding (temporary); . . . aggravated wave impacts, including
erosion, damage, and destruction of built structures; . . . changes in sediment supply that
could alter or destroy natural coastal habitats like beaches and wetlands; . . . saltwater
intrusion on groundwater aquifers, agricultural land, and infrastructure; and magnification
of other climate change impacts, due to the superimposition on sea level rise on shifts in
precipitation patterns that result in more rain and attendant flooding; increased frequency and severity of storms that cause erosion, flooding, and temporary sea level rise
increases; and others.”); Complaint at ¶ 8, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-20184716 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 2, 2018) (stating that “[a]s a direct and proximate consequence
of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, . . . flooding, extreme precipitation events such as
tropical storms and hurricanes, and drought will become more frequent and more severe”
along Rhode Island’s coast).
135
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AR5 CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTION, AND VULNERABILITY, PART A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS 993 (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-PartA_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S356-GZ9T] (emphasis omitted).
134
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Similarly, with respect to the other types of potential harms alleged
by plaintiffs, the AR5 report admitted that current research has not been
able to show that climate change has had an impact on the behavior of
severe storms,136 the frequency of the El Nino–Southern Oscillation weather
pattern,137 the likelihood of more intense and longer droughts,138 or impacts to water quality.139
Additionally, with respect to regional variabilities, researchers have
also not been able to explain why, in large areas of the Antarctic, sea ice
has increased, rather than decreased, in recent years. The IPCC found
that “[t]here is low confidence in the scientific understanding of the small
observed increase in Antarctic sea ice extent due to the incomplete and
competing scientific explanations for the causes of change and low confidence in estimates of natural internal variability in that region.”140 The
IPCC also found that “[d]ue to a low level of scientific understanding there
is low confidence in attributing the causes of the observed loss of mass
from the Antarctic ice sheet over the past two decades.”141
In fact, the IPCC has identified climate change as playing only a
“minor role” with respect to the various types of alleged extreme-weather
harms identified by plaintiffs as providing standing for their lawsuits
against various energy companies.142 In short, the current science reflected
in the AR5 report does not permit an expert to reliably testify to the type
136

Id. (“Recent global and regional studies have found increases in extreme sea levels
consistent with mean sea level trends, indicating that the increasing frequency of extreme
water levels affecting coastal infrastructures observed so far is related to rising mean sea
level rather than to changes in the behavior of severe storms. . . . [T]here is a shortage
of studies discussing the role of climate change in observed impacts on coastal systems.”)
(internal citations omitted); see also id. at 998 (“Studies of normalized losses from extreme winds associated with hurricanes in the USA and the Caribbean, tornadoes in the
USA, and wind storms in Europe have failed to detect trends consistent with anthropogenic
climate change.”) (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
137
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 23 (“Natural variations of the amplitude and
spatial pattern of ENSO are large and thus confidence in any specific projected change
in ENSO and related regional phenomena for the 21st century remains low.”).
138
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, PART B, supra note 127, at 988 (“Since the 1950s some regions
of the world have experienced more intense and longer droughts, although a global trend
currently cannot be established. Longer drought periods have affected groundwater recharge, but changes in groundwater storage are generally difficult to attribute to climate
change, due to confounding factors from human activities.”) (internal citations omitted).
139
Id. (“Likewise, confounding factors do not permit attribution of observed changes in
water quality to climate change.”).
140
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 19.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 1014; id. at Table 18-10.
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of opinions that would be necessary to sustain plaintiffs’ actions seeking
damages against individual defendants on the basis of climate change.
V.

TRIAL COURTS MUST STRICTLY APPLY THEIR GATEKEEPER ROLES
IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION

The gatekeeper responsibilities set forth in Daubert and Sargon
are particularly critical to climate change cases alleging localized impacts.
This area of science involves issues of staggering complexity. A jury made
up of laypersons will have significant difficulty distinguishing between
opinions supported by adequate data, and those based on exaggerated or
misapplied “facts.” The trial court has a responsibility to ensure that the
jury hears evidence that is sufficiently reliable.
This gatekeeper function is also critical because the topic of climate change has become highly political and polarizing, which heightens
the risk that any case is resolved on the basis of personal politics instead
of the evidence submitted to the jury. Recent scholarship has shown a
large and growing divide between how people view climate change based
on their political and ideological views.143 Thus, cross-examination of opposing experts is likely to have limited effect. A trial court cannot simply
allow questionable material to be weighed and considered by the jury in
the hopes that the jury will be able to determine whether the opinion has
merit. Instead, the trial judge has an obligation to ensure that the expert
testimony is reliable and supported by the underlying data.144
Expert opinion testimony is deemed sufficiently reliable if the
expert has “good grounds” for his or her testimony—i.e., if the expert’s
conclusions are based on the knowledge and experience of his or her discipline rather than on “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”145
The Daubert and Sargon standards set forth clear restrictions against
allowing unreliable testimony and evidence into the jury room. Evidence
that is inadmissible under these standards is not limited to “junk science”
or frivolous studies. Serious, heavily funded, and complicated research
143

J.T. Carmichael et al., The Great Divide: Understanding the Role of Media and other
Drivers of the Partisan Divide in Public Concern Over Climate Change in the USA,
2001–2014, 141 CLIMATIC CHANGE 599 (2017); Riley E. Dunlap et al., The Political Divide
on Climate Change: Partisan Polarization Widens in the U.S., 58 ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 4, 16 (2016).
144
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).
145
Id. at 590; see also Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1239
(Cal. 2012) (“conclud[ing] that the trial court has the duty to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to
exclude speculative expert testimony.”).
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will still fail to satisfy these standards if it is insufficiently reliable to
meet the legal standard.
Expert opinions should also be excluded under Daubert where the
conclusions are divorced from the underlying data being relied upon. “A
court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”146 Notwithstanding a trial
court’s potential reluctance to delve into the complexities of the climate
models being submitted by the proposed experts in these cases (i.e., “let
the jury decide”) the court has an obligation to the court system and to
the jury to exclude unreliable and improper materials.147
A.

Climate Models Cannot Be Tested and Are Not Subject to Being
Proved to Be True or False

In Daubert, the Supreme Court recognized that testing hypotheses
and seeing if they can be falsified is the critical component that separates
scientific knowledge from other fields of human inquiry:
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining
whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that
will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and
has been) tested. “Scientific methodology today is based on
generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can
be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes
science from other fields of human inquiry.”148
146

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
See, e.g., McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding
that “the trial court abused its discretion . . . by abdicating its gatekeeper responsibilities”); Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir.
2002) (vacating the admission of expert testimony as the court “abdicated its gatekeeping
role by failing to make any determination that [the expert’s] testimony was reliable”).
148
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added) (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses
and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange
and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992)); see id. (quoting CARL G.
HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966) (“[T]he statements constituting a
scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test.”)); id. (quoting KARL R. POPPER,
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed.
1989) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability,
or testability.”)); see also Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 2017) (excluding expert testimony where the expert “presented a hypothesis only—he failed to
validate it with testing”).
147
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The court specifically noted that scientific methodology involves “generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified.”149
Here, climate models are tested by determining whether the model
can duplicate historical climate conditions. However, due to the complexity
of the climate, the fact that a model can duplicate the past is no guarantee
that it will be able to forecast the future. Additionally, all of the models
have starting points, referred to as “initializations” or subjective inputs, so
it is not possible to compare the accuracy of one model against another.
The fundamental problem [is] the lack of an objective
metric or norm for model error: we have no way of measuring the distance between two models or model-versions in
terms of their input parameters or structure in all but a
trivial and irrelevant subset of cases. Hence there is no
way of allowing for model error by sampling the space of
all possible models in a representative way, because distance within this space is undefinable. If the only way of
measuring model similarity is in terms of outputs, complications arise when we also wish to use these outputs to
compare with observations in the initialisation of a forecast. These problems are particularly acute in seasonal or
climate forecasting where the range of relevant observational datasets is extremely limited. Naive strategies run
the risk of using observations twice and hence underestimating uncertainties by a significant margin.150
In other areas of law, there has been a recognition that the ability
to measure the accuracy of a methodology is an essential component for
its admissibility as reliable evidence. In 2016, President Obama’s Council
of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”) released a report on
forensic science, reviewing 2,100 scientific papers over a year-long study,
to study the validity and accuracy of methods used for testing forensic
evidence in criminal cases.151 The report highlighted the importance of
testing forensic methods:
149

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
Allen et al., supra note 124, at 225.
151
See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS 1–2 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default
/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8VPV-CGWB].
150
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An empirical measurement of error rates is not simply a
desirable feature; it is essential for determining whether
a method is foundationally valid. In science, a testing
procedure—such as testing whether a person is pregnant
or whether water is contaminated—is not considered valid
until its reliability has been empirically measured.152
As explained in the PCAST report, “[t]he method need not be perfect, but it is clearly essential that its accuracy has been measured based
on appropriate empirical testing and is high enough to be appropriate to
the application.”153 “Without an appropriate estimate of its accuracy, a
metrological method is useless—because one has no idea how to interpret
its results.”154
As climate models cannot be easily tested, there is little information about the potential rate of error for these models. The potential rate
of error with respect to a particular model’s prediction is determined by
future events that cannot be known. And because these models generally
attempt to predict events occurring thirty years or more into the future,
courts considering these models for admission will not be able to determine their accuracy for many decades. Their reliability is therefore
inherently suspect.
B.

The Known Error Rate Does Not Support Admissibility

In Daubert, the Supreme Court noted that the known or potential
rate of error is a factor in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.155 As discussed above, the only evidence of error rates must be
drawn from the historical record of climate models that have previously
made predictions regarding future temperatures. The high error rate in
the ability of past climate models to predict future events undermines
the reliability of such models in litigation.156 The AR5 report shows that
climate models have had an abysmal record predicting the future with
111 of 114 models reporting greater warming than what has actually been
observed for the period from 1998 to 2012; or a 97 percent error rate.157
152

Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
154
Id.
155
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
156
See supra Section IV.C.
157
SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 93, at 43.
153
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While the models themselves have wide levels of variability, they
have shown significant inaccuracy in predicting the observed data. Although not without controversy, most scientists acknowledge that there has
been a “pause” in global warming during the start of the twenty-first century (roughly from 1998 to 2012), which varies from the IPCC’s model
predictions.158 Even scientists who do not accept the fact that there has
been a “pause” acknowledge that there is significant variability in climate change and climate change predictions.159 This acknowledged
variability does not allow for the necessary level of reliability to satisfy
Daubert. In short, the error rates for these climate models militate against
admissibility of this evidence.
C.

Climate Models Based on Speculation Must Be Excluded

Courts have a duty to be particularly vigilant about predictions of
the future. For any judge, it is a fundamental principle that expert opinions cannot rely upon conjecture or speculation. As stated in People v.
Richardson, “[e]xclusion of expert opinions that rest on guess, surmise
or conjecture is an inherent corollary to the foundational predicate for
admission of the expert testimony: will the testimony assist the trier of
fact to evaluate the issues it must decide?”160 In Sargon, the Court went
further in cautioning lower courts against allowing experts to provide
speculative assertions regarding future events:
World history is replete with fascinating “what ifs.” . . .
Many serious, and not-so-serious, historians have enjoyed
speculating about these what ifs. But few, if any, claim they
are considering what would have happened rather than
what might have happened. Because it is inherently difficult to accurately predict the future or to accurately reconstruct a counterfactual past, it is appropriate that trial

158

See Rebecca Lindsey, Did global warming stop in 1998?, CLIMATE.GOV (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-qa/did-global-warming-stop-1998 [https://
perma.cc/W8GF-S7NQ].
159
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97, at 960 (“Because of the chaotic and nonlinear
nature of the climate system small differences, in initial conditions or in the formulation
of the forecast model, result in different evolutions of forecasts with time.”).
160
People v. Richardson, 183 P.3d 1146, 1179 (Cal. 2008) (quoting Jennings v. Palomar
Pomerado Health Sys., Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 1117 (2003)).
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courts vigilantly exercise their gatekeeping function when
deciding whether to admit testimony that purports to prove
such claims.161
It is acknowledged among the scientific community that there are
various levels of uncertainty relating to science’s ability to predict future
climate change. There is some agreement on the reliability of broad climate change trends but much less agreement on efforts to accurately
predict the local impacts of those broader trends. Even the climate change
reports from the IPCC recognize the substantial uncertainty in providing
opinions regarding future regional or local impacts of climate change.162
Numerous reports acknowledge that regional climate change predictions
have an equal chance of being wrong as they have of being right.163 These
reports specifically disclaim any ability to predict with reasonable confidence whether specific areas will be impacted by climate change.164
The IPCC has carefully specified its position regarding the degree
of confidence to which the current state of the science can be expected to
predict certain events.165 As to those areas that will be critical for plaintiffs to establish a traceable injury in order to show standing, the IPCC
has already admitted that the current models would not allow an expert
to reliably testify that climate change will cause these events to occur.166
Without sufficient certainty, any predictions that future events will be
caused by climate change fail to satisfy the requirement of reliability set
forth in Daubert and Sargon.167

161

Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1257–58 (Cal. 2012) (emphasis added) (excluding expert whose “attempt to predict the future was in no way
grounded in the past”).
162
See supra Section IV.D and accompanying notes.
163
Pa. State Univ., Global climate models do not easily downscale for regional predictions,
SCIENCEDAILY (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/08/1608241
44031.htm [https://perma.cc/ZUJ7-SXDT]. See generally Marshall Burke et al., Incorporating Climate Uncertainty into Estimates of Climate Change Impacts, 97 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 461 (2015) (discussing uncertainties in climate modeling).
164
See CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 97; CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, PART B, supra note
127; see also Martin, supra note 111 (“Climate models are not good predictors of specific
climate effects, such as the melting of the sea ice or the frequency of major hurricanes in
the north Atlantic.”).
165
See SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 93, at 2 n.1.
166
Id. at 109.
167
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993); Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1250–53 (Cal. 2012).
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CONCLUSION
Climate models are not sufficiently reliable to allow for the admission of expert opinions regarding a particular actor’s contribution to global
warming in a localized region of the world. These climate models are not
appropriate for and do not support the “particularized resolution of legal
disputes.”168 Accordingly, expert opinions based on these models are
properly excluded as insufficiently reliable.

168

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.

